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A CRITICISM OF THE ESTATE BY THE
ENTIRETY
PAUL RITEER
"It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted
in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further
analysis."' When Mr. Justice Holmes made this observation he undoubtedly had in mind the tendency of lawyers to take abstract words,
raise them into artificial dogma, and apply that dogma with inexorably mechanical logic wholly without regard to relevant considerations of history or social policy2 One example of such unrealistic
logomachy is the judicial acceptance into Florida law of the anachronistic English doctrine of estates by the entirety.3 The Florida Supreme Court not only has accepted the doctrine but has added to it

various attributes which no doubt would shock the subtle imaginations
of the early English conveyancers to whom we owe its origin. To use
the language of a learned commentator on the like failing of the Michigan court, the Florida decisions are "a quagmire of inconsistent state-

'Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912)

(Holmes, J., dissenting);

Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 H~av. L. REv. 443, 455 (1899).
2Jerome Frank discusses this foible under the heading Verbalism and Scholasticism in LAW AND THE MODERN MIND C. VII (1930). It is probably an outgrowth
of what one of James Thurber's teachers called "the infinite capacity of the human
mind to resist the introduction of knowledge"; see Thurber, Photograph Album,
The New Yorker, Dec. 1, 1951, p. 45.
31t is not the purpose of this paper to deal with the various details incident
to the doctrine in Florida, since they are known to most lawyers and are competently stated elsewhere: Crosby and Miller, Our Legal Chameleon, The Florida
Homestead Exemption, 2 U. OF FLA. L. Rxv. 12, 32-35 (1949); Legis., Estates by
the Entirety: Creation between Husband and Wife, 1 U. oF FiA. L: Rav. 433
(1948); Note, The Status of Entireties in Florida, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 592 (1951). The
estate is defined in Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 305, 103 So. 833, 834 (1925): "An
estate by the entireties is an estate held by husband and wife together so long as
both live, and after the death of either, by the survivor so long as the estate lasts.
. . . It is an estate held by husband and wife by virtue of title acquired by them
jointly after marriage. . . . The essential characteristic of an estate by the entirety is that each spouse is seized of the whole or the entirety and not of a share,
moiety, or divisible part. Each is seized per tout et non per my. There is but
one estate, and, in contemplation of law, it is held by but one person."

[153]
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ments and contradictory results" and

...

make grotesque, a doctrine

4
already completely anomalous."
Arrival at a proper understanding of the present nature of estates
by the entireties entails the delineation of the English common law
doctrine5 and the development of the concept in Florida.
THE ENGLISH DoCTRINE

The basic characteristics of the modem tenancy by the entirety
were established and known as early as Edward III, whose long reign
stretched through the middle of the fourteenth century. There seems6
to be no plausible or identifiable theory of the origin of this estate.
It was a rarity7 and was of slight importance in the common law
scheme of things.8 It was in that period confined to land and never
existed in personalty. 9 Its genesis, however, was part and parcel of
the quaint and perplexing views of our ancestors on the relation of
husband and wife.10 Comprehension of the doctrine of entireties thus
presupposes knowledge of the peculiar status of married women in
the setting in which this estate existed.
The wife at common law was not a legal person in the present connotation of that term. Blackstone tells us that ".

.

. the very being

or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage ... ."I" She was totally incapable of owning or having any in4Honigman, Tenancy by Entirety in Michigan, 5 MICH. STATE BAR

J.

196, 249,

at 219 and 284 respectively (1926). In fairness to the present members of the
Florida Supreme Court the writer wishes to state that practically all of the Florida
doctrine hereinafter criticized owes its origin to judges no longer on the Court.
5As it existed in England down to July 4, 1776; see FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1951).
6See Honigman, supra note 4, at 198: "It was at an early day regarded as a
'nice distinction,' without any attempt to justify it as based upon sound reason or
good public policy. What was in truth the ovum of this estate, will probably
ever remain a mystery." In Clark v. Clark, 56 N.H. 105, 110 (1875), the estate
is referred to as "That mysterious joint tenancy in which the subtle genius of the
... Cf. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
English real law so much delighted itself.
ENGLISH LAW 128 (5th ed. 1942).
7CHALLiS, Law of Real Property 364 (3d ed. 1911).

SThe estate is given only slight mention in Digby's well-known treatise, INTRoDUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 278 (5th ed. 1897).
92 WALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 31 (1947); Note, 33
HARV. L. REv. 983 (1920); see also note 53 infra.
10CHALLIS, op cit. supra note 7, at 376; 2 POLLOCK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 246 (2d ed. 1905).
"1 BL. COMM. *442.
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terest in personal property. 12 Indeed, she was not even entitled to
earnings derived from her personal labor. 13 For all practical purposes
she could not own or have any present interest in land. The husband
had a freehold estate for the duration of the marriage in all land
either owned by the wife at the time of the marriage or conveyed or
devised to her during the marriage. He had the exclusive right of
possession, as well as ownership of the rents and profits of such land.
He could convey this estate of his without the wife's consent, and his
creditors could levy on it. So complete was his dominion that upon
his death his personal representative, and not the wife, was entitled
to the crops growing on her land.14 Furthermore, when issue was born
to the marriage the husband became vested with a life estate in the
wife's land. 15 The necessity of confining land tenure to those capable
of performing feudal duties accounts for these disabilities of the wife.'6
Because such disabilities attended the wife the common law jurists
could not think in terms of capacity on her part to bear the relation
to her husband of joint tenant or tenant in common, especially in
view of the various mutual rights and duties incident to those tenancies between persons sui juris. Consequently, whenever land was conveyed or devised to a husband and wife, they did not take separate
moities, as did the other species of cotenants, but rather took by the
entirety. The whole title was vested in both with an indestructible
right of survivorship.17 The right of survivorship in joint tenancy
could be destroyed through conveyance by one of the joint tenants;' 8
and this characteristic, plus the disability of one of the entirety tenants, was the only essential difference between the two tenancies. As
Honigman picturesquely puts it, "... the estate by the entirety was in
122 BL. COMM. *433; 3 HoLmswoRTII, op
MAITLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 404.
13DICEY, LAW AND PUBLIC OPINION IN

cit.

supra note 6, at 532; POLLOCK AND

ENGLAND

373

(2d ed. 1914); 3 HoLs-

"WORTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 526, 528.
' 4DIGBY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 403; 3 HoLswORTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at
525; 2 POLLOCK AND MArrLAND, op. cit. supra note 10, at 403; 1 WALSH, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 703-705 (1947); WALSH, HisroRY OF ANGLOAMERICAN LAW 148 (2d ed. 1932); 1 WASHruRN, TREATiSE ON THE AMERICAN
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 292 (6th ed. 1902).
15DIGBy, op. cit. supra note 8, at 174; see also authorities cited in note 14 supra.
l6See Phipps, Tenancy by Entireties, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 24 (1951).
172 BL. COMM. *182. Curiously, if a man and woman were co-owners of land
and subsequently married each other, no tenancy by the entirety resulted, Honigman, supra note 4, at 200.
282 BL. COMM. 0185.
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its origin a mere joint tenancy, adorned with the disabilities of coverture and a fortuitously conceived notion of an indestructible survivorship."19
For a long time it has been fashionable to attribute the origin of
the tenancy by the entirety to the theory that husband and wife are
one person, and to deem this a sufficient explanation; 20 and some
have called this estate a joint tenancy modified by the doctrine of
unity of husband and wife. 21 Such attempts at exposition are nothing
but a play on words, seized upon in order to avoid analysis, or are
at most a mere metaphorical way of saying that the wife is under
disability. Pollock and Maitland have aptly exposed this delusive
22
generality:
"In particular we must be on our guard against the common belief that the ruling principle is that which sees an
'unity of person' between husband and wife. This is a principle
which suggests itself from time to time; it has the warrant of
holy writ; it will serve to round a paragraph, and may now
and again lead us out of or into a difficulty; but a consistently
operative principle it cannot be."
2
Another writer speaks of the fallacy as follows:

3

"Were numerical repetition by courts and text writers the
sole criterion of historical truth, we would have no alternative
but to accept the doctrine that the existence of the tenancy by
entirety is directly attributable to the common law notion of
the unity of husband and wife. An inquiry into the nature of
the common law conception of the identity of the spouses
leaves, however, little doubt as to the fallacy of such doctrine.
"In legal contemplation, as in any other sense, there never
has been an absolute unity of husband and wife."

IDSupra note 4, at 199.
20See, e.g., 2 BL. COMM. 0182.
2lSee, e.g., Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
220p. cit. supra note 10, at 405-406.
23Honigman, supra note 4, at 196; see also Whittlesey v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337,
339 (1836): "And the reason given is, that husband and wife are one. If that were
the real reason, it is very difficult to see why a deed to the wife would not be, in
effect, a deed to the husband and wife, and vice versa."
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Instead of saying that the common law regarded husband and wife
as one person, it is more nearly correct to say that the wife was regarded as no person. For those content to explain the origin of entireties by a mere turn of words, the latter phrase is closer to the
truth.
In view of the above peculiarities with reference to married women, the existence in the common law of such an anomaly as the entirety is plausible and understandable, but it does not seem subject
to logical explanation.24
Notwithstanding the peculiar nature of the entirety doctrine, its
limits and features seem to have been dearly established and understood in relation to the pre-nineteenth century common law. As in
the case of the wife's land,25 the husband had complete control of
the entirety land. He owned all the rents and profits and could, without the wife's consent, convey the title and ownership, subject only
to the possibility that she might outlive him and come into the property by way of survivorship. His creditors could levy on his interest
in the entirety property.2 6
Excepting only her right of survivorship, which was merely a
future interest, the wife's interest in the entirety land was no greater
than her interest in her husband's individual land.2 7 And, with the
same exception, the husband had as great an interest in the wife's
28
land as he had in land held by the entireties.
Thus the English common law doctrine of tenancy by the entirety can be fairly restated for all practical purposes as amounting
to no more than this: The husband becomes the individual owner of
land conveyed to him and his wife; and his ownership is subject to
termination in the sole event of her surviving him, whereupon she
29
becomes the individual owner.
24See note 6 supra.
25See note 14 supra.
262 IWALSH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 31-34 (1947); 1
WASHBURN, op. cit. supra note 14, at 563 et seq.; Honigman, supra note 4, at 282;
Note, 29 MIcH. L. REv. 788 (1931).
27See note 26 supra.
2
8See notes 14 and 26 supra.

29We realize that this statement is lacking in the precision necessary for technically correct definition of real property concepts, but believe it serves the pur-

pose of showing roughly the net practical effect of the English entirety doctrine as
it originally existed. See Note, 23 HAnv. L. RFv. 405 (1910): "But since at common
law the husband during his life had absolute control over his wife's separate estate,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol5/iss2/3
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THE FLORIDA DEVELOPMENT

The tenancy by the entirety which existed in the English common
law down to the fourth day of July, 1776,30 although somewhat
anomalous, was not out of harmony with the archaic system of which
it formed a part. The Florida cases present a different picture.
Until as late as 1913 estates by the entirety did not exist in the

law of Florida. Co-ownership of property by husband and wife existed
by virtue of the same forms of co-ownership that applied to parties not
married to each other. At least, nothing in the Florida Constitution,
statutes, or reports indicated the existence of estates by the entireties,
and there was in 1913 affirmative evidence in the Florida sources of
law that such estates could not exist here. At that time our legislative

policy against the common law doctrine of survivorship had long been
in force and was clearly expressed. 3 1 Florida had abolished the dis32
ability of married women to own separate interests in property,
yet this was the very disability which had been the foundation of the
doctrine of entirety at the common law. 33 Furthermore, the courts
of the country in which the doctrine of entirety had originated had
two decades before held that the doctrine could not exist in view of

statutes enabling married women to hold separate property. 34 There
was also a respectable array of well-reasoned American decisions show-

ing clearly that the entirety doctrine had no place in a legal system re35
One very able decognizing separate property of married women.

it would seem to follow that the wife's interest in an estate by entirety would become vested in the husband for that period; so that having the entire interest in
the estate, he could make a conveyance or mortgage, valid until his death."
30FLA. STAT. §2.01 (1951).
31FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1951), enacted originally in 1829. Estates by the entirety
were later, by Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20954, excepted from the operation of the statute.
32FLA. CONST. Art. XI, §1, provides: "All property . . . of a wife . . . shall be
her separate property .... " See also FLA. STAT. §708.02 (1951), enacted originally
in 1845. The term "all property" seems explicit enough to include the wife's interest in property co-owned with her husband.
33See note 10 supra.
34Thornley v. Thornley, [1893] 2 Ch. 229. See also Chitty, J., in Mander v.
Harriss, 24 Ch. D. 222, 229 (1883).
35E.g., Walthall v. Goree, 36 Ala. 728, 735 (1860): "Since the Code, therefore,
a devise to husband and wife is not a grant to a single person, but to two persons,
each of whom is capable of taking a separate estate. Both of the grantees being
capable of taking separately, it is impossible that they should take by entireties,
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cision rejected the doctrine on the broader ground that it "... is
repugnant to our institutions, and to the American sense of
*."..,36
justice .
With the relevant authorities so strongly against the doctrine of
entireties in Florida, as above shown, English v. English7 came to
the Florida Supreme Court in 1913. It involved the single question
of the right of the widow of a deceased to take by survivorship all of
the land of which they were co-owners. The Court, in a brief opinion
which relied largely on a quotation from a then popular encyclopedia,38 answered this question in the affirmative.3 1 The opinion
rejected without discussion the suggestion that the legislation referred
to above abrogated the doctrine of entireties. Such failure by courts
to take legislative policy into account has been the source of frequent

as if they constituted a single person. Of necessity, they take by moieties. Being
thus invested with the capacity of taking by moieties, the reasons on which the
rule of the common law was founded has [sic] ceased to exist ....
"; Whittlesey
v. Fuller, 11 Conn. 337 (1836); Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 (1875); Hoffman v.
Stigers, 28 Iowa 302 (1869); Robinson, Appellant, 88 Me. 17, 22, 33 At. 652, 654
(1895): "The rule of the common law creating estates by entirety is irreconcilable
with both the letter and the spirit of these statutes. It never rested upon a
rational or substantial groundwork. It had its origin in feudal insitutions and
social conditions which were superseded centuries ago by the more enlightened
principles of a progressive civilization. It is now repugnant to the American idea
of the enjoyment and devolution of property and to the true theory of the marriage relation ....
The fictitious basis of this rule having been removed the rule
itself must fail." See also Note, Effect of the Married Women's Property Acts upon
Estates by the Entirety, 37 HARv. L. Rxv. 616 (1924).
SaKerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663, 671, 84 N.W. 92 (19G0); see Niles, Abolish
Tenancy by the Entirety, 79 Tausrs AND ESTATES 366 (1944).
3766 Fla. 427, 63 So. 822 (1913).
3815 Am. & ENG. ENcy. LAW 847 (2d ed. 1900). Wigmore has deplored this
practice in 1 EVIDENCE 243 (3d ed. 1940): "There is no discrimination in the use
of expository authorities. Such a discrimination is the mark of a sound legal education and a correct scholarly standard. But, in the judicial opinions, the superficial products of hasty hack-writers, callow compilers, and anonymous editors,
are given equal consideration with the weightiest names of true science. The reliance upon anonymity is always a mark of literary and juristic crudity. Almost
any printed pages, bound in law-buckram and well advertised or gratuitously
presented, constitute authority fit to guide the Courts."
39The Court concluded this decision with the following statement: "There
would seem to be no occasion for further discussion or citations." For an estimate of the justice who wrote the opinion in the English case see 1 Holmes-Pollock
Letters 168-169 (Howe ed. 1941).
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criticism4o and was condemned by
follows: 41

the late Harlan F. Stone as

"It is difficult to appraise the consequences of the perpetuation
of incongruities and injustices in the law by this habit of narrow construction of statutes and by the failure to recognize
that, as recognitions of social policy, they are as significant and
rightly as much a part of the law, as the rules declared by
judges. A generation ago no feature of our law administration
tended quite so much to discredit law and lawyers in the lay
mind. A narrow literalism too often defeated the purpose of
remedial legislation, while a seeming contest went on with the
apparent purpose of ascertaining whether the legislatures
would ultimately secure a desired reform or the courts would
succeed in resisting it."
In English v. English the Court assumed that the adoption of
the entirety doctrine was compelled by the statute incorporating the
pre-1776 English common law into our lawA2 Roscoe Pound, speak-

ing for the Nebraska Supreme Court, had already laid bare the fallacy of such reasoning:43
"We can not think, and we do not believe this court has
ever understood, that the legislature intended to petrify the
common law, as embodied in judicial decisions at any one time,
and set it up in such inflexible form as a rule of decision. The
theory of our system is that the law consists, not in the actual
rules enforced by decisions of the courts at any one time, but
the principles from which those rules flow; that old principles
are applied to new cases, and the rules resulting from such ap-

4OSee, e.g., Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS
213, 223, 239 (1934); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383
(1908).
41The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (1936).
42FiA. STAT. §2.01

(1951).

43Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 470, 94 N.W. 705, 708 (1903); see also Day,
Extent to which the English Common Law and Statutes are in Effect, 3 U. OF FLA.
L. REV. 303 (1950), especially 315 et seq.; Pope, The English Common Law in
the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6, 19 (1910).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1952

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1952], Art. 3
ESTATE BY THE ENTIRETY
plication are modified from time to time as changed conditions
and new states of fact require ....
The term 'common law of
England,' as used in the statute, refers to that general system
of law which prevails in England, and in most of the United
States by derivation from England, as distinguished from the
Roman or Civil Law system, which was in force in this territory
prior to the Louisiana purchase. Hence the statute does not
require adherence to the decisions of the English common-law
courts prior to the Revolution, in case this court considers subsequent decisions, either in England or America, better expositions of the general principles of that system."
The next episode in this segment of Florida legal history was the
Ohio Butterine case,44 holding that the judgment creditor of a husband cannot reach his interest in the entirety real estate. The Court
relied on the doctrine of inseverability, a doctrine that has correctly
been said to be "based on a misconception of the common law." 45 The
common law did not immunize the husband's interest from his creditors but on the contrary made it subject to levy.46 The Florida Court
recognized that some decisions follow the common law view, but
thought them inapplicable because of the married women's legislation abrogating the common law control of the husband over the
wife's property. Thus the Court held applicable to the entirety property the very legislation which, in the English case, had been held
not applicable to it.
Quotations from decisions in two subsequent cases illustrate this
same inconsistency, which runs throughout this segment of the law.
Allardice & Allardice, Inc. v. Weatherlow summarized the basis of
the decision thus: "But, as above pointed out, the wife's interest in an
estate by entireties does not constitute a part of her separate estate." 47
In Newman v. The EquitableLife Assurance Society of the United
48
States, however, the Court said:
...

but the interest or property rights which a married woman

44Ohio Butterine Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).
45Honigman, supra note 4, at 284.
46See note 26 supra.
4798 Fla. 475, 479, 124 So. 38, 40 (1929).
48119 Fla. 641, 648, 160 So. 745, 748 (1935).
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has in an estate by the entireties held by her and her husband
during his life, is [sic] her separate property, under the comprehensive provisions of Section 1, Article XI of the Constitution.

The holding in the Ohio Butterine case 49 constitutes the most unjust feature of the Florida entirety doctrine. Of the forty-nine jurisdictions in the United States only twenty recognize the entirety doctrine, and of this latter group seven states permit levy on the husband's interest; in fact six permit levy on the interest of either
spouse. 50 Thus Florida is one of a minority of thirteen jurisdictions.
Bailey v. Smith 5 extended the entirety doctrine to personal property. Although the opinion in the Bailey case cites two English decisions as authority for the assumption that the common law recog52
nized the doctrine as to personalty, this assumption is unwarranted.
Nor do the cited cases support the Court's position; indeed, the plain
implication of one is directly contrary. 53 Florida is among a minority
of ten American states recognizing the entirety doctrine in personal
54
property.
The three Florida cases discussed, which embody fallacies already
mentioned, constitute the foundation for the superstructure embodied
in a congeries of some fifty-odd subsequent cases of diverse and bewildering implications. Even a few of these later paradoxes illustrate
adequately the illogical nature of the whole situation.
The Court has held that the husband has the right of possession
and control of personal property owned by the entireties, 55 and that

49See note 44 supra; Niles, supra note 36; Note, 29 MIcti. L. REv. 788 (1931).
50Phipps, supra note 16, at 46-57 (1951).
5189 Fla. 303, 103 So. 838 (1925).
52See note 9 supra.
53In Christ's Hospital v. Budgin, 2 Vern. 683, 23 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1712), the
court ". . . looked upon the wife to be in the nature of a joint purchaser .... "
It nevertheless stated by way of dictum that on the death of the husband his
creditors should take priority over his wife in the distribution of personalty owned
jointly by the spouses. Coppin v -............--------------[sic]. 2 P. Wins. 497, 24 Eng.
Rep. 832 (1728), dealt only with the taxation of costs in a suit by husband and
wife to redeem their land from a mortgage, and neither said nor implied anything
with reference to the possibility of tenancy by the entirety in personalty.
54Phipps, supra note 16, at 46-57.
55Mann v. Etchells, 132 Fla. 409, 182 So. 198 (1938); Merrell v. Adkins, 131 Fla.
478, 180 So. 41 (1938).
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the husband alone can effectively transfer the title to such property. 56
Exactly the reverse has been held with reference to real property; 57
and this unexplained difference raises some odd problems. The Ohio
Butterine opinion 58 assigned the husband's lack of control over the
entirety realty as the reason for his lack of any interest upon which
levy might be made. Since the husband does have control over the
entirety personalty, it would seem to follow that the Ohio Butterine
case is inapplicable and that entirety personalty can be levied upon
by his creditors. There is no assurance that our bench will so hold,
however.59
So strong is the Court's position on the husband's lack of control
over the entirety realty that in Richart v. Roper,60 even though the
husband had been exercising de facto control over the entirety realty,
an agreement executed by him for a short-term lease was held void.
If, instead of such a freehold estate, however, the husband and wife
have a leasehold estate in land it is an open question whether the
Court will hold valid a lease, assignment or sublease by the husband
alone on the authority of the doctrine that he may transfer entirety
personalty. 61
The element of unity of title seems to be the very touchstone of
the estate by entireties. Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Florida
has gone so far as to hold that, even though the instrument under
which husband and wife hold property expressly provides for severability of their interests, an estate by the entirety results. 62
CONCLUSION

We believe it almost futile to try to administer justice by maintaining and extending obsolete and grossly inconsistent abstract con5GAmerican Cent. Ins. Co. v. Whitlock, 122 Fla. 363, 165 So. 380 (1935).
57Allardice & Allardice, Inc. v. Weatherlow, 98 Fla. 475, 124 So. 38 (1929);
Ferdon v. Hendry Lumber Co., 97 Fla. 283, 120 So. 335 (1929); Ohio Butterine Co.
v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920).
ssSupra note 57.

59Apparently no argument was made in Lindsley v. Phare, 115 Fla. 454, 155 So.
812 (1934), as to a distinction between realty and personalty; this case predated
the decisions cited in note 55 supra, giving the husband control of personal
property.
60156 Fla. 822, 25 So.2d 80 (1946).
GlSee cases cited in notes 55 and 56 supra.
62Hagerty v. Hagerty, 52 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1951).
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cepts in a legal system functioning in an entirely changed social environment. The inconvenience to the bar in the unproductive labor
of manipulating such a crazy-quilt patchwork of incongruous rules
is enough in itself to condemn the doctrine of entireties as it exists in
Florida. It is furthermore unjust and socially undesirable for our
law to foster a contrivance so easily adapted to rendering each spouse
"judgment-proof" against all debts not joint. The entirety device is
also used as a means of thwarting the present Florida policy with
63
reference to the descent of homestead realty.
Justice, enlightened social policy, and common sense demand that
the Legislature pass an act completely abrogating the doctrine of
entireties.64 There is no reason at all why modem man and wife
should be in a different position from that of other cotenants.

63Crosby and Miller, supra note 3, at 67-77, especially at 73.
64Doubt may be raised as whether abrogation of the present law could be constitutionally applied to presently existing estates by the entireties, but we believe
that this question is answered by the authorities holding valid the abolition of
existing incidents of a no less justiafiable anachronism, the doctrine of contingent
remainders; see 1 SiMas, TnE LAW OF FUTURE INTr.Srs 99, 194 (1935). Of course
such legislation would not affect the rights of spouses who had already acquired
the complete ownership by survivorship.
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